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TASINI V. NEW YORK TIMES: THE PROBLEM
OF UNAUTHORIZED SECONDARY USAGE OF
AN AUTHOR'S WORKS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has become the driving force of the information age,
forcing those in the business of communication to change the way
they look at the world. The Internet and the World Wide Web
allow for virtually unregulated access for millions of users to the
"information superhighway."1 It is changing the ways people
communicate with one another, the way people entertain them-
selves, and the way that people obtain information. With the
technology available, items posted on the World Wide Web can be
accessed from nearly anywhere in the world. For decades, people
have relied on the morning newspaper and the nightly news
programs as their main source of information. The availability of
information from the Internet may be bringing those days to an
end. Unsurprisingly, breakthroughs in communication are forcing
those in the media to adapt to the new technology if they want to
maintain their audiences. These breakthroughs are also pushing
the limits of the law. In many areas, the evolution of the law has
not maintained pace with the evolution of technology.
For writers and publishers, this rapidly changing environment
has spawned conflicts that will be resolved in the courts. The right
to post articles on the World Wide Web, and to otherwise make
articles accessible via the personal computer, has created a new
category of rights under the traditional doctrine of copyright law.
So-called "electronic rights" have become a newly recognized stick
in the bundle of rights protected by copyright law. The ownership
of these rights, publisher versus author, was at stake when
Jonathan Tasini and a group of plaintiffs sued their publishers in
New York Federal District Court.2 Jonathan Tasini believes it is
' Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Liability on the Internet, 212 N.Y.L.J. 3 (1994)
("Unlike other communications industries that are heavily regulated, the Internet is
relatively unfettered, having no central regulatory body to control its free-wheeling growth.").
2 See Ron Abramson, Publishers Sigh With Relief After 'Tasini', 218 N.Y.L.J. 5 (1997)
("The decision ... concerns a significant issue that has been of concern to newspapers and
other media for several years as electronic and 'new media' markets have developed for their
publications. The action was clearly structured by the plaintiffs as a 'test case.' ").
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a grave danger to allow publishers to gain more control over the
works they publish.3 In Tasini's view, this case will have an
impact on the freedom of information in this country as well as an
effect on the way in which authors are paid for their work.
II. THE TASINI CASE: A BATTLE OVER INTERNET
PUBLISHING RIGHTS
The Internet has become a major medium in the information age.
The Tasini case involves a dispute over who will control much of
the substance of the Internet. The plaintiffs are freelance writers
who believe that the Copyright Act gives them control over their
article's dissemination. The defendants are publishing companies
who believe that they have the right to put articles on-line, without
securing permission from the authors.
A. CASE BACKGROUND
Jonathan Tasini is the lead plaintiff of a group of authors4 who
allege that their publishers have committed copyright infringement
by including the authors' freelance articles on CD-ROMs and in the
publisher's on-line accessible electronic databases without compen-
" Jonathan Tasini, Publishers Seeking Gold Give Writers the Shaft, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27,
1995, at B5 ("But as a technological revolution reshapes the way we work, relax and
communicate, here are the names that will control authorship in the future: Time Warner,
Microsoft, Westinghouse and their publishing brethren, including corporations that own
newspapers.").
' The plaintiffs are members of the National Writers Union ("NWLT'). Jonathan Tasini
is president of the NWU and is a labor and economics writer. The other plaintiffs are: Mary
Kay Blakely ("As a writer I naturally prefer methods of persuasion over litigation. I joined
the lawsuit because, as Frederick Douglass said a hundred years ago, 'Power concedes
nothing without a demand. It never has. It never will.' "); Barbara Garson, a Guggenheim
award winner and NEA and New York State Council of the Arts fellowship recipient; Margot
Mifflin, an art and entertainment writer; Sonia Jaffe Robbins, ("I joined this lawsuit because
electronic sources represent a new publishing medium, and therefore, there need to be new
relationships between publishers and freelance writers concerning publishing in this new
medium"); and David Whitford, a former editor of Sport magazine ("I've been interested in
electronic copyright issues ever since I came across my byline one day while exploring
Knowledge Index(KI), an electronic database. It bugged me to know how much foraging in
KI was costing me, and yet somebody. else was getting paid for my work. I felt robbed.").
National Writers Union, Plaintiffs'Biographies and Statements (last modified Jan. 11, 1997)
<http'J/www.igc.apc.org/nwu/tvt/tvtbios/htm>.
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sating the authors.5 In the words of Emily Bass, attorney for the
plaintiffs, the case boils down to "[w]ho owns the electronic rights
to articles free-lance authors have written?"' Many were sure to
watch the decision in the case in this modern, lucrative age of on-
line publishing and electronic media.7
The plaintiffs wrote articles on a freelance basis for publications
such as Newsday, New York Newsday, The New York Times, Sports
Illustrated, and The Atlantic.8 Traditionally, these publications
worked out an informal agreement with the author to buy the
stories once they were written. The agreements between publishers
and freelance writers were often no more than oral agreements as
to the length, topic, and fee to be paid for an article.' Since the
industry practice rarely resulted in any type of written contract, 10
the Tasini court held that it was unable to use the written
agreements between the parties as determinative evidence of which
rights were retained by the authors and which rights were assigned
to the publishers."
'Martin Garbus, Who Owns Electronic Rights in the New Media?, 212 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1994)
("The complaint claims, among other things, that the defendants, without paying plaintiffs,
redistributed and reused fiction and non-fiction works, novels, plays and articles plaintiffs
created, on CD-ROMs, databases, on-line services and other electronic distribution
channels.")
a Amended Complaint for Copyright Infringement at 1, Tasini v. New York Times Co.,
972 F. Supp. 804, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (No. 93 Civ. 8678(SS)).
' Judge Sotomayor agrees that the new technology involved in this case has made
aelectronic rights" a very economically valuable commodity. ("IT]oday's world of pricey
electronic information systems .... .") Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 827.
'Amended Complaint for Copyright Infringement at 2-5, Tasini (No. 93 Civ. 8678 (SS)).
'Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 807.
1o Only plaintiff Whitford and Sports Illustrated had any kind of written contract. This
contract, besides specifying the length and content of the article, also included the following
terms. Sports Illustrated was acquiring the rights: (1) to first "publish the Story in the
Magazine," (2) "the non-exclusive right to license the republication of the Story whether in
translation, digest, or abridgement form or otherwise in other publications, provided that the
Magazine shall pay to you [Whitford] fifty percent (50%) of all net proceeds it receives for
such republication," and (3) "the right to republish the Story or any portions thereof in or in
connection with the Magazine or in other publications published by The Time Inc. Magazine
Company, its parent, subsidiaries, or affiliates, provided that you [Whitford] shall be paid
the then prevailing rates of the publication in which the Story is republished." Tasini, 972
F. Supp. at 807.
" Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 811. See. Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Comment, Don't Put my Article
Online!: Extending Copyright's New-Use Doctrine to the Electronic Publishing Media and
Beyond, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 899, 908 (1995) (Freelance authors "consider themselves to be
'modernday sweatshop workers' who scrape a living with low salaries and no benefits. They
3
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This dispute arose when the freelance authors' works were placed
into electronic databases without the authors' permission. The
databases contain works by both freelance authors like Jonathan
Tasini and writers who are employees of the publication. The
employee writers do not have cause to protest the distribution of
their works on-line since under the "work for hire"12 doctrine the
copyright in those works is automatically owned by the employer
publication.13 However, the copyright in works made by indepen-
dent contractors, or in this case free lance writers, automatically
vests in the author and not in the publishers.14
The plaintiffs alleged two types of copyright infringement in their
lawsuit.
1. Direct Copyright Infringement. The first claim is against the
publishers for direct copyright infringement. The plaintiffs were
the sole creators of the articles and did in fact secure copyrights for
their pieces. Unlike those authors covered by the work for hire
doctrine, these authors were not employees of the publishers. 5
The rights expressly granted to the publisher, in the case of
Jonathan Tasini, (whose rights are representative of the whole
group of plaintiffs) were "first, one time, North American print
publication rights."6 The plaintiffs argue that once the articles
believe that they are entitled to the rights to their works on new media, which would enable
them to license the works to the original publisher, if they choose, for reissuance on the
electronic media.").
12 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) ("A 'work made for hire' is - (1) a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or
commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work.... ."). See also Community For
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 10 U.S.P.A.2d (BNA) 1985 (1989) (explaining
the distinction between independent contractors and employees in a work for hire context).
s 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994) ("In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title,
and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by
them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.").
" 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994) ("INITIAL OWNERSHIP. Copyright in a work protected
under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint
work are coowners [sic] of copyright in the work.").
"' Articles written by employees of the publishers or the magazines would qualify as
works for hire. As works for hire, the publishers would obtain full rights in those articles.
The publishers would be the original copyright holders and would be allowed to make
revisions in the articles themselves. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
" Amended Complaint for Copyright Infringement at 7, Tasini v. New York Times Co.,
972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y.) (No. 93 Civ. 8678 (SS)).
604
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were initially published in either the magazine or newspaper, the
publishers' rights were fully exhausted. Despite this, the publish-
ers sold the stories to University Microfilms Inc., (UMI) and The
Mead Corporation, (now called LEXIS/NEXIS, referred to herein as
"Mead") for inclusion in the allegedly infringing electronic databas-
es and CD-ROMs.17 The plaintiffs stated in their complaint that
this sale:
[Iinterferes with plaintiffs exclusive right to repro-
duce or license reproduction of the copyrighted work,
to prepare derivative works based upon the copy-
righted work, to distribute or license distribution of
copies of the copyrighted work, to publicly perform
or display the copyrighted work or license others to
publicly perform or display the copyrighted work on
electronic media, and to authorize all of the above.'8
2. Contributory Copyright Infringement. The plaintiffs next
charged the publishers with contributory copyright infringement
based on the publishers' actions of providing the on-line services
and CD-ROM manufacturers with their stories.'9 "IN MOST
CASES (with the exception of one CD-ROM publication created by
electronic imaging), the articles in question were reduced to 'text
files' and stripped of their print formatting and any accompanying
photos and advertisements, and supplemented by identifying data
(author, citation, etc.) appended to the text."20 The on-line servic-
es and CD-ROM manufacturers then directly infringed by using the
plaintiffs' stories in their products.
The plaintiffs state in their complaint that the agreements
between the publishers on one side and the electronic database
providers and CD-ROM producers on the other, infringes on their
copyrights. The plaintiffs complain that this infringement has
deprived them of the economic benefits to which they are entitled.
'
T Id. at 10.
Is Id. at 9.
"The plaintiffs only charge contributory infringement to the extent the publishers
cooperated with the electronic database providers. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 809 n.3. They did
not seek to base the contributory infringement claim on the potential direct infringement by
users of the electronic databases. Id.
'o Abramson, supra note 2, at 5.
19981 605
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B. REMEDIES SOUGHT
The plaintiffs asked for the standard remedies of a copyright
lawsuit. They asked for an injunction prohibiting further distribu-
tion of their articles and a declaratory judgment that the publish-
ers' actions constituted copyright infringement. They also sought
damages, measured by the amount of profits the publishers
received as a result of their infringement, as well as attorney fees.
C. THE DECISION
The case was tried in United States District Court in the
Southern District of New York before Judge Sonia Sotomayor. The
defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted on August
13, 1997.21 Judge Sotomayor framed the issue as "whether
publishers are entitled to place the contents of their periodicals into
electronic data bases [sic] and onto CD-ROMs without first securing
the permission of the freelance writers whose contributions are
included in those periodicals."22 Judge Sotomayor explained, "the
Court applied Section 201(c) of the Copyright Act and determined
that defendants had properly republished plaintiffs' individual
freelance articles as part of electronic 'revisions' of the newspapers
and periodicals in which those articles first appeared."
23
On October 29, 1997, the plaintiffs' motion for a rehearing was
denied by Judge Sotomayor.24 In their motion, the plaintiffs
raised three objections to the judge's decision. First, plaintiffs
argued that plaintiff Whitford should have prevailed based on the
Court's rejection of Time Incorporated's contract defense.2"
Second, the plaintiffs argued that "even accepting the Court's
interpretation of Section 201(c)[of the Copyright Act], there is a
disputed question of fact as to whether any of the electronic
technologies involved in this case qualify as permissible revi-
21 Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 827.
2 Id. at 806.
2 Tasini v. New York Times Co., 981 F. Supp. 841, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration).
2'Id. at 851.
2l d. at 843.
606 [Vol. 5:601
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sions."  Finally the plaintiffs "contend[ed] that the Court
mistakenly accepted defendants' representations that plaintiffs had
failed to raise an infringement claim relating to certain article
abstracts created in connection with one of the disputed technolo-
gies, 'General Periodicals OnDisc.' "27 Despite these rational,
seemingly persuasive arguments, Judge Sotomayor denied the
motion for a rehearing, leaving the plaintiffs to seek relief in the
court of appeals or in Congress.28
Judge Sotomayor found that the compilation of electronic
databases constituted permissible "revisions" within the parameters
of section 201(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976.29 She agreed with
the defendants' position that they did not improperly exploit the
plaintiffs' articles but permissibly reproduced the articles as
"electronic revisions" of the collective works in which the articles
originally appeared. ° The judge construed the controlling lan-
guage of the Copyright Act as follows:
The first sentence of Section 201(c)-providing that
the "[clopyright in each separate contribution to a
collective work is distinct from copyright in the
collective work as a whole, and vests initially in the
author of the contribution"-essentially reiterates the
substance of Section 103(b). If the provision ended
with its first sentence, plaintiffs would prevail in this
action .... In its second sentence, however; Section
201(c) expands upon the baseline established in
'Id
27 Id.
981 F. Supp. at 843.
Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The statute
provides:
Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is distinct
from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests initially in the
author of the contribution. In the absence of an express transfer of the
copyright or of any rights under it, the owner of copyright in the
collective work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of
reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular
collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later
collective work in the same series.
17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).
'o Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 806.
1998] 607
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Section 103(b)3' by extending to the creators of
collective works "only the privilege of reproducing
and distributing the contribution as part of that
particular collective work, any revision of that
collective work, and any later collective work in the
same series .... " The determinative issue here,
then, is the precise scope of these "privileges."32
The "revisions" in this case were electronic reproductions created
by extracting individual articles from the original "collective
works," the magazines, and placing the articles into a huge
database, mixed with other articles from different issues of the
publication and articles from other publications.33 The complaint
alleged that this was an impermissible revision because the
defendants were not in fact "revising" the collective works, but were
merely selling the individual parts much like one would sell old
parts from a scrap automobile.' Plaintiffs argued that the
defendants exceeded their privileges when they sold the articles to
the database providers.35  Thus, the only remaining protectable
interest in the collective works then held by the publisher was any
"The statute provides:
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from
the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any
exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work
is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration,
ownership or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting
material.
17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1994).
" Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 814.
3Id. at 807-809.
The attorney for the plaintiffs characterized the issue this way:
This is a case about spare parts and the used vehicles they come
from-vehicles that bear a striking resemblance to used cars. In the life
of an automobile, there comes a time when that vehicle is worth more
disassembled than left put together. Then, the car is taken apart, and
its parts are sold off.... The same fate now awaits today's newspaper
or magazine and tomorrow's literary or social science journal.
Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion For Summary Judgment on the
Issue of Liability at 1-2, Tasini (No. 93 Civ. 8678(SS)).
' Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 809.
608 [Vol. 5:601
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original expression contributed by the editors and publishers.36
There was very little of this original expression in the revisions,
since the electronic databases only contain the text of the arti-
cles-all original arrangements, pictures, captions, advertisement,
and artwork from the original collective works had been re-
moved." The plaintiffs argued that instead of the databases being
"revisions" of the collective works, they are merely catalogs
impermissibly reselling the authors' individual articles.3 8
The court held that even though the electronic databases look
very different from the original magazine or newspaper, they were
still within the statute's meaning of "revision." 9 In particular,
Judge Sotomayor found "[t]he structure and language of Section
201(c) confirm that the parameters of a permissible revision are
broader than plaintiffs suppose."4 The court interpreted the
Copyright Act to say that publishers are not allowed to "revise" in
a way that changes the content of the individual articles, but they
can make dramatic changes to the overall medium in which the
articles appear.4 The only limitation on the "revisions privilege"
found by the Tasini court was that the revision "must be recogniz-
able as a version of a preexisting collective work if it is to be fairly
characterized a revision of 'that collective work.' "42 To be a
revision under Section 201(c), the court required the subsequently
published collective work to retain a "significant original aspect" of
the original collective work."3
One aspect of originality from the collective work on which the
court focused was the actual "selection" of the collected articles.
The court found that the publication's editors' selection of an article
'aId. at 821.
87 ld. at 821, 823-24.
38 Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion For Summary Judgment
on the Issue of Liability at 2, Tasini (No. 93 Civ. 8678(SS)).
"Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 825.
40 Id. at 819.
4 Id. at 819-820. In summarizing the legislative history of section 201(c), the court
stated, "authors were comfortable permitting publishers broad discretion in revising their
collective works, provided that individual articles would remain intact." Id. at 819.
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for use in the magazine was itself original expression." The court
emphasized the substance of a selection as being an element of
original expression by noting that "[tihe defendant publishers'
protected original selection of articles, a defining element of their
periodicals, is preserved electronically."45 The court also noted
that the electronic databases "tagged" the articles by identifying the
magazine and the issue where the article was originally pub-
lished.4 6 This "tag" further supported the court's finding that the
selection of the article was itself original expression retained in the
revision notwithstanding the electronic database context.
III. TASINI: A MISGUIDED DECISION
A. INTRODUCTION
This case, like many others that "cyberspace" will generate, turns
on the issue of copyright ownership. When examining such a
dispute, the logical starting place is the Copyright Act of 1976,
Section 201 titled, "Ownership of copyright".4 Section 201 lays
the statutory groundwork for resolution of copyright ownership
disputes, and frequent reference to it will therefore be necessary.
B. PLAINTIFFS' CONTRACT THEORY OF RECOVERY
One of the Tasini plaintiffs' strongest arguments was based on
the contracts between the publishers and the writers.4 As
previously discussed, the contracts were generally informal
agreements between writer and publisher, which were in keeping
with standard industry practice.49
"The Tasini court reviewed the Supreme Court's analysis of originality in compilations
and stated that the cases show "that 'the amount of creativity, required for copyright
protection of a compilation is decidedly small,' and that the mere selection of information for
publication can often times [sic] reflect sufficient originality to warrant copyright protection."




'" 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
4" Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment on
the Issue of Liability at 10-12, Tasini (No. 93 Civ. 8678(SS)); Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 810-812.
'9 Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 806.
610 [Vol. 5:601
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The defendants' publications, for the purposes of copyright law,
are "collective works."5" According to section 201(c) of the Copy-
right Act, which defines copyright ownership in collective works:
Copyright in each separate contribution to a collec-
tive work is distinct from copyright in the collective
work as a whole, and vests initially in the author of
the contribution. In the absence of an express
transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it,
the owner of copyright in the collective work is
presumed to have acquired only the privilege of
reproducing and distributing the contribution as part
of that particular collective work, any revision of that
collective work, and any later collective work in the
same series.5'
It is clear in the Tasini situation that the copyright initially
vested with the author of the contribution, Tasini. The question
then became, since there was no dispute that at least some rights
were transferred to the publisher, what copyright ownership rights
were transferred by Tasini and what rights were retained by him.
The defendants argued that even if their actions in creating an
electronic database of their collective works exceeded the scope of
the privileges given them by the Copyright Act, 2 their actions
were not infringing because the plaintiffs expressly transferred any
electronic rights in their contributed articles. This "express
transfer" argument was deemed without merit and was rejected by
Judge Sotomayor.53
1. Ambiguity in the Contract. Defendant publisher Newsday's
basis for its assertion that electronic rights were expressly trans-
60 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) ("A 'collective work' is a work, such as a periodical -issue,
anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and
independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.") (emphasis added).
" 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (emphasis added).
62 17 U.S.C. § 201(c); see supra text accompanying note 51 (printing the text of the
statute).
3 Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 810-12 ("Time contends that its 'first publication rights must
be interpreted to extend to NEXIS .... The right to publish an article 'first' cannot
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ferred to it was the royalty check given to the author to pay for the
article. The check included a legend stating that by endorsing the
check the author released to the publisher the right to place his
article in an "electronic library archive."54 Judge Sotomayor
agreed with the plaintiffs that the check legend afforded the
publishers no defense.5" The Judge found that the legend was
ambiguous and could therefore not be a defense for the publisher
because section 201(c) requires an express transfer of rights."
Furthermore, by the time the paycheck was given to the author, the
defendants had already sold the article to the electronic databases
and thus the infringing act occurred before the check was received,
let alone signed by the author. 7 In addition, one author, Tasini,
scratched through the legend before endorsing the check.58
The Supreme Court has spoken on the very issue of technological
changes which render contracts ambiguous.5 9  In Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, the Court held that a restaurant
owner does not commit copyright infringement by playing copy-
righted music through loudspeakers in his restaurant when the
music is an authorized broadcast received through the use of a
radio because this use did not violate the copyright owners' right of
performance.' When discussing the purpose of the Copyright Act,
Justice Stewart referred to a statement by Lord Mansfield:
[Wle must take care to guard against two extremes
equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who
have employed their time for the service of the
community, may not be deprived of their just merits,
and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the
Id. at 810 (noting "the publisher relies upon the language providing that Newsday has
the 'right to include [plaintiffs' articles] in electronic library archives.' ") (alteration in
original).
" Id. at 811.
w Id.
7 Id. at 810 (holding the later signature by the author was a later writing confirming an
earlier oral agreement).
"Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment on
the Issue of Liability at 14, note 13, Tasini (No. 93 Civ. 8678(SS)).
" Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65
(1975).
' Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 161-62.
612 [Vol. 5:601
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other, that the world may not be deprived of im-
provements, nor the progress of the arts be retard-
ed.6
1
Applying this balancing of values to the Tasini situation, it seems
reasonable to allow the freelance authors to be able to demand
compensation for the exploitation of the electronic rights to their
works. On one hand, because the writers make very little money
to begin with and the competition to be published is great, giving
authors this protection will not discourage public dissemination of
information. To the contrary, it will allow many writers to support
themselves economically through their writing alone, and thus
more quality writing would be produced. On the other side of the
balance, the writers' ownership interest in the electronic rights to
their works furthers the purpose of securing their "just merits, and
the reward of their ingenuity and labor ......
The court in Tasini agreed with the plaintiffs that their contracts
did not expressly give the publishers the rights to use the articles
in electronic databases. The court, however, found that because the
contracts were ambiguous, this issue was not determinative, and
moreover, was not even strong enough to defeat the defendants'
summary judgment motion.' The Supreme Court, in Twentieth
Century Music Corp. specifically addressed the issue of ambiguity
resulting from changes in technology:
"The sole interest of the United States and the
primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopo-
ly" this court has said, "lie in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors."
When technological change has rendered its literal
terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be con-
strued in light of this basic purpose."
eI ld. at 156 n.6 (quoting Sayre v. Moore as quoted in Cary v. Longman, 102 Eng. Rep.
138, 140 n.(b) (1801)) (alteration in original).
6 Id.
Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
"Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156 (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286
U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
19981 613
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As explained above, recognizing the authors' ownership of the
electronic rights in their works furthers the primary purpose of
copyright by both securing a fair return for the creators and
stimulating artistic creativity for the general good.
2. Lack of Consideration. Plaintiffs also argued that even if the
legend had been unambiguous, it would not have been binding for
lack of consideration. The bargain was the author's contribution of
the story in exchange for the publisher's payment reflecting the
right to publish the contributed article. Here, the publisher
attempted to add another condition to the deal, transfer of all
electronic rights in the work while giving no more than the price
agreed upon as the bargain for the right of first publication.
Without consideration for the extra conditions, they fail a general
contract analysis.
The Copyright Act addresses the issue of express transfers of
copyright ownership: "A transfer of copyright ownership.., is not
valid unless an instrument or conveyance, or a note or memoran-
dum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the
rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent."65
As to publisher Sports Illustrated, its slightly more formal
contract consisted only of a letter to the plaintiff, David Whitford.
The letter stated that the publisher was buying the right "first to
publish" the article." The plaintiffs, however, argued that this
language plainly meant that once the article was initially published
in the magazine, the publisher had exhausted its rights.67
Seemingly, the ordinary meaning of the phrase "first to publish"
would limit the publisher to the initial, one-time right of first
publication. Nonetheless, Time Incorporated argued that the right
to first publish extended to the electronic database use of the
article." However, the publishers argument was based on a case
involving primarily rights dealing with television and movie
displays.69 Judge Sotomayor rejected the defendant's position
saying, "[tihe right to publish an article 'first' cannot reasonably be
17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1994).
6 Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 811.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 811-12.
" See Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 157 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 65 (2d Cir.
1968) (discussing rights in the context of TV and movie displays).
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stretched into a right to be the first to publish an article in any and
all mediums."70
Even though Judge Sotomayor sided with the plaintiffs on this
point of the case, the court ultimately held for the defendants.
There is, however, significant case law that suggests that the
contracts issue should have been determinative in favor of the
plaintiffs, or at least should have enabled them to survive the
defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Both parties agree that the contracts, whether oral or written, as
in Sports Illustrated's case, are simple, relatively uncomplicated
documents. However, this does not mean the contracts should
carry less weight with the court. These parties were not careless
or unusually sloppy in their negotiations. Rather, the writers and
publishers were following the standard industry practice of utilizing
informal agreements in their dealings.7 The court held that the
contracts did not expressly grant all rights in the copyrighted works
to the defendants because the contracts were ambiguous. However,
it seems that if the court had examined the contracts, within the
context of the publishing trade,72 their plain meaning would have
been clear. Farnsworth wrote, "[wihen interpreting contract
language, courts start with the assumption that the parties have
used it in the way that reasonable persons ordinarily do .... From
this assumption comes the maxim, expresso unius est exclusion
alterius ('the expression of one thing is the exclusion of anoth-
er')".73 In the case before the court, the expression "first" should
therefore have been read to exclude "later" or "other" publication
series.
Understanding that the publishing business regularly uses
informal agreements to make deals with writers, the court should
70 Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 812.
7' In the words of lead plaintiff Tasini, "a new power game has demolished long-standing
relationships between authors and publishers." Jonathan Tasini, Publishers Seeking Gold
Give Writers the Shaft, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27 1995, at B5.
7' Contracts should be interpreted "when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent
person who has examined the context of the entire integrated agreement and who is
cognizant of the customs, practices, usages and terminology as generally understood in the
particular trade or business." Sayers v. Rochester Telephone Corp. Supplemental
Management Pension Plan, 7 F.3d 1091, 1095 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Walk-In Medical
Centers, Inc. v. Breuer Capitol Corp., 818 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1987)) (emphasis added).
73 E. ALAN FARNSWORTH, UNITED STATES CONTRAcT LAW 117 (1991).
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have been comfortable interpreting the phrase "rights to first
publish" in an unambiguous way. In Playboy Enterprises Inc. v.
Dumas,74 the court examined industry practice and its relevance
between publishers and those from whom they purchase works.
Playboy involved art work, purchased by Playboy Magazine from
the artist's widow. The issue was whether Playboy has the right
to make and market reproductions of that art. The court wrote:
[Tihe custom and practice in the magazine industry
was to acquire one-time rights, unless explicitly
stated otherwise. Thus any transfer would be
thought to transfer the rights in an unpublished
work such that the magazine would secure publica-
tion with notice in the work, and then transfer the
rights in the work back to the author upon re-
quest.7 5
The court in Tasini should have followed the courts that have gone
before it and given the practice of the industry greater determina-
tive weight in the contracts analysis. While it is true the Playboy
court did specifically note that their findings concerned a period
from 1974 to 1978,78 the language used in the contracts and the
similarities in the transactions make it applicable to Tasini as well.
Based on the findings of the court in Playboy, it would clearly seem
that whatever was included in the bundle of rights purchased by
the defendants by means of the "first, one-time" contracts, the right
to mass marketing, post-print publication through cyberspace was
not among them.
It is revealing to examine the contracts from each of the parties'
point of view in order to best determine what was intended by the
words, "right to first publish." Initially, from the writers' point of
view, this was seemingly another informal agreement to write an
article for the publishers. It would be safe to assume that the
writers' expectations were that the article would be included in the
",831 F. Supp. 295,28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1561 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) affd in part, rev'd in part,
vacated in part, and remanded, 63 F.3d 549, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (2d Cir. 1995).
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magazine and nothing else. Certainly if the authors had expected
the articles to end up on the electronic databases, they would not
have objected later when that occurred. However, from the
publishers' point of view, it seems reasonable to believe that at the
time of the contract with the writers, the publishers were aware
that they planned to use the articles not only in print, but in
electronic form as well. The publishers were the only ones who
could know their true intentions for the articles. And they entered
into these contracts, allowing the plaintiffs to proceed on the belief
that they were only agreeing to sell the print rights of their works.
In other words, the general purpose of the writers Was to convey
the print rights to the publishers. Farnsworth has written, "It
seems proper to regard one party's assent to the agreement with
the knowledge of the other party's general purposes as a ground for
resolving doubts in favor of a meaning that will further those ends,
rather than a meaning that will frustrate them."77 Had Judge
Sotomayor applied Farnsworth's "purpose interpretation" analy-
sis," the court would have likely given greater weight to the
contacts between the parties.
Further, some case law also suggests that the contract between
the publishers and the writers should have been given more
determinative weight by the trial court. For example, the Ninth
Circuit has stated, "the license must be construed in accordance
with the purpose underlying federal copyright law. Courts have
repeatedly stated that the Copyright Act was 'intended definitively
to grant valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc....
to afford greater encouragement to the production of literary works
of lasting benefit to the world.' "" The encouragement of author-
ship is furthered most effectively when authors are permitted to get
the maximum value from the work they produce. This means
receiving payment for all of the uses for which their work is
purchased. One argument presented by the National Writers
Union, (of which Jonathan Tasini is the President), framed the
issue this way: "The media conglomerates are taking away the
77 FARNSWORTH, supra note 73.
78 Id.
7' Cohen v. Paramount Pictures .Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Washington Publ'g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)).
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livelihood of writers, driving them out of business. If writers
cannot get their fair share and make a decent living, it will mean
fewer contributors to our arts and sciences and a decline in
independent voices, making our society culturally poorer.""
"Getting a fair return" for their work should translate into a certain
price for the print rights, along with a price for the right of on-line
distribution. A copyright is not one right; using the familiar
property analogy, it is like a "bundle of sticks."
Therefore, the courts should interpret the Copyright Act as giving
the holder of a copyright a "bundle of rights"8" that can be trans-
ferred or retained in pieces not just as a whole.
Section 106 of The Copyright Act codifies the various rights
possessed by the copyright owner.82 Regarding transfer of the
rights that accompany ownership of a copyright, section 201(d)
makes it clear that "ownership of a copyright may be transferred
in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of
law ....
Arguably, the plaintiffs in Tasini only transferred the right to
"first publish" the articles. Thus, under the words of section 201(c)
and (d), the rights to display and distribute the article via electron-
ic databases should be retained by the original owners.
wo National Writers Union, Tasini vs The New York Times: What's at Stake for the Public?
(last modified Aug. 14, 1997) <http'J/www.igc.apc.orgJnwu/tvt/tvtpubl.htm>.
e See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990) (stating "ain author holds a bundle of
exclusive rights in the copyrighted work ...
82 Section 106 provides:
[Tihe owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do
and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonore-
cords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works,
including the individual images of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
' 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1994).
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Despite Judge Sotomayor's agreement with the reasoning of the
plaintiffs on the contract issue, the court nonetheless dismissed the
plaintiffs complaint. If not dispositive, the questions raised about
this issue should have at least gotten the plaintiffs past the
defendants' motion for summary judgment. General Mills, Inc. v.
Filmtel International Corporation," another case from the South-
ern District of New York, is instructive on this point. In that case,
a licensee brought an action seeking declaratory relief and damages
because of the defendants' opposition to the licensee's attempt to
exercise his right to exhibit the cartoons on cable television and
through home video cassettes.85
Much like the Tasini case, the dispute revolved around whether
the language of the contract allowed the plaintiff (the licensee in
General Mills, analogous to the publishers in Tasini) to exploit the
copyrighted material through particular mediums.8" The contract
at issue provided that the plaintiff would have the right to exhibit
the cartoons "on television ... without limitation."87  First, the
court held that this phrase could not convey to the plaintiff the
right to exploit the cartoons through video cassettes because "these
media comprise 'an entirely different device involving an entirely
different concept and technology from that involved in a television
broadcast.' "" The court in Tasini should have applied this
principle concerning "different mediums" and allowed the plaintiffs'
case to proceed.
Secondly, the court in General Mills did not grant either party's
motion for summary judgment, because the issue of whether the
"without limitation" language* applied to cable television was
unresolved by the contract between the parties.8" "The collective
agreement must be regarded as ambiguous in this regard and
resort must be had to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the intent of
the parties. Thus a question of fact is presented with respect to the
construction of the right granted, and summary judgment is
84 599 N.Y.S.2d 820, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1638 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
" Id. at 820-21.
86 Id.
8' Id. at 821.
Id. (quoting Tele-Pac, Inc. v. Grainger, 570 N.Y.S.2d 524 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)).
General Mills, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
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inappropriate."" The Tasini case at least created a question of
fact as to the construction of the right granted and thus should also
have been allowed to proceed past summary judgment.
C. PLAINTIFFS' STATUTORY BASIS FOR RECOVERY: PRO-AUTHOR
POLICIES EMBODIED IN THE COPYRIGHT ACT
The Copyright Act has evolved out of the Intellectual Property
Clause of the United States Constitution. While one purpose of
intellectual property laws (particularly copyright, patent and trade
secret law) is to provide motivation to creators of valuable works for
society, another, often overlooked purpose of intellectual property
laws, is to compensate the creator for his or her efforts.9
Congress spoke of the purposes of copyright law before the 1976
Act was passed. "While some limitations and conditions on
copyright are essential in the public interest, they should not be so
burdensome and strict as to deprive authors of their just reward
.... [Tiheir rights should be broad enough to give them a fair
share of the revenue to be derived from the market for their
works."92 In Tasini, the plaintiffs only want the fair return for
their works. The publishers sell their works to electronic distribu-
tors, yet the writers do not receive any of these proceeds.
One Supreme Court decision that highlights the Congressional
value of ensuring that writers get a fair return for their work is the
1990 decision in Stewart v. Abend.93 In Stewart, the holder of
renewal rights in the copyright of a magazine story sued the holder
of rights to a motion picture made from the magazine story.94 The
Court held that renewal rights in the copyright statute were
intended to give authors a second chance to obtain fair payment for
their works.95 Much like the situation in Tasini, the Stewart
Court addressed rights that become more valuable over time and
the author's entitlement to receive compensation in relation to the
9Id. at 822.
91 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 209 (1990).
2 Id. at 229 (quoting the REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, 87TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., 6 (Comm. Print 1961)).
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value of those rights.96 Whereas many casual observers see the
purpose of copyright to be the production of useful works for
society, the Stewart Court makes clear that this is only one part of
the proper balance of purposes.97 "Moreover, although dissemina-
tion of creative works is a goal of the Copyright Act, the Act creates
a balance between the artist's right to control the work during the
term of the copyright protection and the public's need for access to
creative works."98
Judge Sotomayor's decision takes all control away from the
writers. The creators have no voice in how their works are
distributed through a medium as vast as the World Wide Web. The
Stewart Court went on to state, "in fact, this Court has held that
a copyright owner has the capacity arbitrarily to refuse to license
one who seeks to exploit the work."9 9 Although often forgotten,
the Court has made it clear that copyright law is designed to
protect and compensate creators just as it serves to motivate
creation for the good of society.
In the context of this litigation, copyright protection serves to
help balance the unequal bargaining positions of the publisher and
the freelance author. The publisher has much greater bargaining
power since it can hire other writers to do features for it, presum-
ably authors who will give most or all of their rights in the work to
the publisher for the cheapest price. One role of the copyright law
is to give the author some leverage with which to bargain. "The
limited monopoly granted to the artist is intended to provide the
necessary bargaining capital to garner a fair price for the value of
the works passing into public use."'0 0 The Tasini plaintiffs
agreed to do the requested articles, for the agreed upon price, with
the understanding that what was being transferred to the publisher
was specifically the "first, one time, North American print publica-
96Id. at 229.
97 Id. at 228.
98 Id.
Id. at 229.
" Id. at 229. See also, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
546, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1073 (1985) ("The rights conferred by copyright are designed to
assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors.")
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tion rights."10 1 The copyright law, as stated in Stewart, should
have been interpreted by the court as preserving the remaining
rights, (particularly the electronic rights) in the plaintiffs, so that
the plaintiffs would have the requisite bargaining power to sell
those rights and receive a fair return for their work.
The overriding purpose of copyright protection (and patent
protection for that matter) is found in the Intellectual Property
Clause of the United States Constitution. 2 Promoting the useful
arts serves a societal interest by providing an incentive (a limited
monopoly) for their creation. When Congress enacted the Copyright
Act, certain limitations were imposed so that the public would
actually: receive the benefit of the works produced.0 3  However,
the limitation of copyright protection was not intended to "short
change" authors. "While some limitations and conditions on
copyright are essential in the public interest, they should not be so
burdensome and strict as to deprive authors of their just reward
.... [Tiheir rights should be broad enough to give them a fair
share of the revenue to be derived from the market for their
works."' In Tasini, both parties bargained from the position
that the price of the articles was the value of the right to print the
articles in the respective magazines or newspapers. Nowhere in
the decision or in the plaintiffs' complaint, which detailed the
negotiations and arrangements between the parties, is there
mention of the stories being distributed after publication by
electronic media. In Tasini, the fact that the agreement only refers
to "print publication rights" as opposed to simply "publication" or
"distribution" rights suggests that the price agreed upon was less
than the "fair return" for what the publishers in fact took from the
plaintiffs.
If a goal of the copyright law is to make valuable information and
creations available to the public, that goal is served by enforcing
o Amended Complaint for Copyright Infringement at 7, Tasini v. New York Times Co.,
972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (No. 93 Civ. 8678(SS)).
"02 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. ... ").
'03 Stewart, 495 U.S. at 229 (quoting the REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT LAW
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only the publishers' right to use the articles once in their publica-
tions. To go further and allow the distribution of the articles
through on-line services and CD-ROMs alters the balance struck by
the copyright law between authors' rights and society's interests too
far in favor of public dissemination. The Tasini decision harms the
author's ability to bargain for his rights to his article and prevents
the author from receiving just compensation for that work. 05
Concerns arise when independent voices cannot devote themselves
to their work because vast corporations refuse to give them a fair
return for their articles. The inequality in bargaining power
between the author and the publisher prevents a true bargain from
being agreed upon. Jonathan Tasini expressed this concern in an
article for the Los Angeles Times:
Instead of a fair give-and-take, (where a writer might
license a work for a specific use-for instance one
use in print only-in return for some compensation),
the word has come down from these multimedia
giants to authors, demanding unlimited use in all
sorts of print and electronic formats. The publishers
tell us: 'Here's the contract; take it or leave it."'
The Tasini decision, even if eventually reversed, will not solve
the problem writers face when trying to sell their work. "All
rights" contracts 7 may prevent authors who lack substantial
bargaining power from receiving a fair return for their work.
Circulation throughout the Internet and the World Wide Web
attracts an audience that is potentially much larger than many of
108 Id. at 229 (quoting Ringer, Renewal of Copyright (1960), reprinted as COPYRIGirr LAW
REVISION STUDY No. 31, PREPARED FOR THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH
CONG., 2D. SESS., 125 (1961)) (Congress wanted to give [the author] an opportunity to
benefit from the success of his work and to renegotiate disadvantageous bargains... made
at a time when the value of the work [wals unknown or conjectural and the author...
necessarily in a poor bargaining position.").
,06 Tasini, supra note 71.
'o These contracts are being used more frequently by publishers seeking to insulate
themselves from this sort of litigation. These contracts transfer "all rights" to the publisher.
Tasini described the issue as such: "we must redouble our efforts to turn back the all-rights
contracts plague seeping throughout out industry." Jonathan Tasini, Writers Win Mqjor
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these publications would have through print distribution alone.
It follows that greater circulation would lead to more exposure of
articles written by free lance authors. Likewise, greater exposure
will make the rights held by the authors more valuable, and thus
more expensive to the publisher seeking to purchase them. The
traditional price scale reflects the parties' assumption about the use
to which the articles would be put, such as publication in a
magazine or newspaper. The new price scale (which the publishers
predictably would oppose, since it will be more expensive for them)
should reflect the new and growing use of electronic distribution of
the articles. The Stewart Court when addressing the pricing of
copyrighted works, wrote, "[alt heart, petitioners' true complaint is
that they will have to pay more for the use of works they have
employed in creating their own works. But such a result was
contemplated by Congress and is consistent with the goals of the
Copyright Act." 1
°8
Jonathan Tasini wrote his article with the understanding that it
was to be used in the publisher's traditional printed medium.
Tasini did not anticipate use of the work in the relatively new and
expanding electronic, on-line media. However, just because a
copyrighted work is used in a new medium does not necessarily
mean the court should disallow the new use. In Bourne v. Walt
Disney Co.,'0 9 the court examined an agreement transferring
certain copyrights for motion picture distribution. The plaintiffs
sued when the defendants used video tape distribution for the
copyrighted work. The court allowed this new use to continue,
despite the fact that at the time of the agreement the parties did
not contemplate that specific form of distribution. °"0
However, the Bourne situation is distinguishable from Tasini.
"Movie rights" can reasonably encompass the right to market a
movie through the medium of video machines. The market for
"theater" movies is virtually identical to the market for video
rentals. In consumers' minds, the "theater" movie and the "home
rental" movie may be interchangeable. This is not the case for the
relationship between printed articles and on-line accessible articles,
such as those in Tasini.
'08 Stewart, 495 U.S. at 229.
'o 68 F. 3d 621, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (2d Cir. 1995).
"o Id. at 630.
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The Tasini situation involves a much more attenuated connection
than that between movie and video and a much greater technologi-
cal leap, from publication in the printed form to the on-line
accessibility afforded by the World Wide Web. The average
consumer, even in this day of increasing Internet access and use,
does not interchangeably read news or feature articles in their
favorite newspaper on-line. Public perception is that magazines
and newspapers come out regularly and are "one shot deals"; a
missed issue does not come back in "re-runs." This differs from the
movie goer's perception that he can put off seeing a movie because
it will soon appear on home video and can be viewed at his leisure.
Against this backdrop of practicality, the plaintiffs agreed to sell
the "one time print rights" to the defendant publishers. Unlike the
Bourne decision, this transfer of copyright should not be read to
include the electronic rights.
D. PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENT THAT ELECTRONIC DATABASES SHOULD
NOT BE CLASSIFIED AS "REVISIONS"
Section 201 of the Copyright Act of 1976 allows transferees of
copyrights to exercise the "privilege" of "reproducing and distribut-
ing" the contribution to a collective work, and any "revision of' that
collective work.' The defendant publishers in Tasini claim that
they are within their rights under the statute since the on-line use
and the CD-ROMs are nothing more than revisions of the original
collective work, the magazine or newspaper. Judge Sotomayor
agreed with the defendants on this point and granted their motion
for summary judgment."2 In her decision, Judge Sotomayor
wrote, "[bly retaining the publisher defendants' original selection
of articles, however, the electronic defendants have managed to
retain one of the few defining original elements of the publishers'
collective works. In other words, NEXIS and UMI's CD-ROMs
carry recognizable versions of the publisher defendants' newspapers
and magazines. For the purposes of Section 201(c) then, defen-
dants have succeeded at creating 'any revisions' of those collective
works." 3
"' 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1996).
112 Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 827.
"s Id. at 825.
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The plaintiffs strongly disagreed with Judge Sotomayor's
characterization of the electronic databases."' In the preface to
the Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for
Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability, Emily Bass, attorney
for the plaintiffs wrote, "[tihis is a case about spare parts and the
used vehicles they come from-vehicles that bear a striking
resemblance to used cars .. . .""' She went on to analogize the
way that used cars are sold off in pieces when the owner can get
more money for them as scrap, to a publishers' selling off of
magazine articles after their use for current print publication is
exhausted." 6
One of the preeminent copyright cases in this area is Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, Inc., which held that
the Constitution requires some degree of originality in order for a
work to be afforded copyright protection." 7 In that case, the
Court held that no infringement occurred when a telephone book
publisher used the listings from a local phone book." 8 All that
was "taken" from the local phone directory was the names,
addresses and phone numbers." 9 The Court held that the rural
phone directories publisher had not contributed any originality to
the contents of the directory, and therefore, it was not protected by
copyright. 1
20
In Tasini, involving a collective work, the copyright in the
collective work as a whole (as opposed to the copyright in the
individual articles making up the collective work) extends only to
the compiler's exercise of original arrangement, decoration, style,
selection, or the like. Unlike the phone directory in Feist, maga-
zines are comprised of many "original" additions beyond the articles
they contain.
Magazines are mediums exemplifying that collective works are
more than the sum of their articles. Stylistic choices made in
... See generally Tasini, supra note 71.
"" Plaintiffs' Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Their Motion For Summary Judgment
On The Issue Of Liability at 1, Tasini (No. 93 Civ. 8678(SS)).
I' id. at 1-2.
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
12 Id. at 364.
"' Id. at 343.
I' d. at 363-64.
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Newsweek or Time set each magazine apart from other magazines
such as Rolling Stone or Playboy, though both types of magazines
are likely to contain articles about current events and popular
culture. The market for each publication is different and consumer
tastes are reflected in the way each magazine is marketed. Despite
these "decorative" variations, the articles may be very similar. If
one were to strip away all logos, designs, and arrangements, and
provide only the texts of the articles, a casual consumer would
likely be hard pressed to identify the origin of all but the most
obvious pieces. The difference in styles is what makes some
magazines stand out on the newsstand rack. When that style is
stripped away, the publisher's originality also disappears.121
However, this was not the conclusion reached by the Tasini court.
The defendants and the district court seem to believe that the
selection of the article in the first place is all that is required for
sufficient originality under 201(c). They conclude that since the
article the publisher selected is the one placed onto the CD-ROM
or on-line electronic database, that original selection is retained.
The publishers "tag" their articles when they convert the piece from
print to electronic form. According to the defendants and the court,
readers know the publication and the issue in which the article
originally appeared and any originality embodied in the selection
of the article for publication is preserved in the "revision." This
argument, if allowed by the courts, would permit the publishers to
use an article in any desired form simply by calling it a permissible
revision.
Even though the threshold for originality is low, the Court has
said that it is a threshold.122 Lowering the threshold for original-
ity of collective works to the point that selection and labeling
suffice eradicates any meaningful threshold. It seems that the
periodicals really have been stripped down to their bare bones, the
articles, and sold off in pieces for reuse, just as the plaintiffs
described in their initial complaint.123 This low threshold lies in
121 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) ("Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work
is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole.. .
'22 Feist, 499 U.S. at 346.
12 Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law In Support Of Their Motion For Summary Judgment
On The Issue Of Liability at 1-2, Tasini (No. 93 Civ. 8678 (SS)).
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tension with the "significant original aspect"124 the court also
requires. The Feist standard, being constitutional in nature,
deserves more respect from the court.
IV. EPILOGUE (AND A SILVER LINING)
Where do the Tasini plaintiffs go from here? For certain,
Jonathan Tasini, his fellow plaintiffs, and the National Writers
Association have not surrendered. An appeal is possible. However,
the extensive discovery and litigation was expensive, and the
attorneys involved may not have the resources to continue against
the media giants."2 In Mr. Tasini's view, the war is not over,
"It]his decision merely shifts the venue of the battle to Congress,
where several legislators have already indicated support for
copyright legislation that will correct the court's interpretation of
the law."2 6 Even Judge Sotomayor suggested in her decision that
"[ilf Congress agrees with plaintiffs that, in today's world of pricey
electronic information systems, Section 201(c) no longer serves its
intended purposes, Congress is of course free to revise that
provision to achieve a more equitable result." 27  It is indeed
interesting and revealing that at the end of the opinion, just before
the defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted, the
judge implied that this decision is not equitable. 28
The National Writers Union has proposed another solution to
deal with the problem of unauthorized secondary usage of their
works. By 1996, the NWU established the Publication Rights
Clearinghouse (PRC).'29 The Clearinghouse is designed to func-
tion for writers much as the American Society of Composers,
14 Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 821.
12 Emily Bass of Burstein and Bass stated in a telephone conversation with the author
of this note that while she disagreed with the decision, the future of the case was in doubt
because of the financial burden of litigation. Interview with Emily Bass, attorney at
Burstein and Bass (Sept. 1, 1997).
" National Writers Union , Tasini et al vs The New York Times et al and the Future of
Copyright (last modified Feb. 8, 1997) <http'/www.igc.apc.orgJnwu/tvt/tvtcopyr.htm>.
12 Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 827.
128 Id.
'2 National Writers Union, The Publication Rights Clearinghouse the National Writers
Union Solution, (last modified Aug. 14, 1997) <http'Jigc.apc.org/nwu/tvt/tvtprc/.htm>.
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Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) does for musicians. °30 By using
available technology, the PRC will track licensees' usage of articles
in the Clearinghouse. The NWU explains that functionally,
PRC enrolls freelance writers who have retained
secondary rights to previously published articles.
Those articles become part of a PRC "repertoire"
that, in turn, is licensed to database companies. The
companies collect royalties on customer orders from
the PRC repertoire and send them to PRC in lump
sums; PRC breaks down and distributes the money
to authors.13" '
Jonathan Tasini, a charter member of the PRC, president of the
NWU, 32 and lead plaintiff in the Tasini litigation, believes, "[the
ultimate solution is a one-stop worldwide multimedia clearance
center. PRC's early success shows that this is real and possi-
ble."33 Unfortunately, the incentive of major publishers to
negotiate with the PRC may have greatly diminished in the post-
Tasini media industry.
Although publishers are now entitled to exploit the electronic
rights of those freelance authors who are the very source of the
publishers income, there may be a silver lining for the writer. This
decision will likely lead to more on-line use of the articles printed
in the magazines and newspapers. In turn, these writers' works
will be exposed to more people than they otherwise would in print.
And, while a newspaper or magazine article is well suited to on-line
browsing, longer works, such as short stories and novels, are not.
Most people still like to read from "real paper" and not a computer
monitor. This could result in greater name recognition for the
writers while giving their audience a taste of their work. Assuming
the audience likes what it reads on-line, other printed works by
these authors will likely receive a boost in sales from the audience
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One might ask why people would buy what they can access on-
line for free. The fact is that most people would rather not read
large volumes of works on the computer screen, and most consum-
ers are not so cheap that they will try to save a few dollars by
printing and binding pages and pages of a work. If the average
consumer likes something seen on-line, he or she will most likely
purchase the hard copy.
This may not seem like much of a "silver lining" to the Tasini
plaintiffs who are proceeding with litigation as a matter of principle
as much as they are seeking fmancial compensation. However,
unless the appellate courts change their current stance or Congress
acts on the matter, it may be all they have.
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